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This paper explores the proﬁtability of portfolio-based momentum strate-
gies. The data consists of all NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks on the
CRSP database. The analysis considers the period July 1963 to December
2002 and the tests are performed on portfolios formed on industry, size and
book-to-market. The departure from earlier studies lies in the way we test
for proﬁtability. To avoid the serious problem of data-snooping we apply
the procedure provided by White (2000). Overall, we ﬁnd strong evidence
of a momentum eﬀect where an investor takes a long position on the win-
ner portfolio and a short position on the loser portfolio. Hence, we reject
the hypothesis of weak market eﬃciency. Splitting the sample in two parts,
1963:07 to 1981:12 and 1982:01 to 2002:12 we found that the best momentum
strategy was proﬁtable during the ﬁrst period and not during the second.
The overall signiﬁcance is thus driven by events in the earlier part of the
sample and it appears that the market has become more eﬃcient.
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In eﬃcient markets, asset prices are assumed to fully reﬂect all available informa-
tion in the market. Consequently, it should be impossible to earn risk adjusted
abnormal returns by exploiting investment strategies based on past information.
However, several empirical studies suggest that past return are powerful predic-
tors of future stock returns. It appears that if you buy a portfolio of stocks that
performed best in the last year, and short a portfolio of the worst performers, you
will make money over a period of six months and perhaps a year. This eﬀect is
known as the “momentum”.
Several studies have uncovered the momentum anomaly in the U.S. stock mar-
ket. Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) show that strategies that buy stocks that have
performed well and sell stocks that have performed poorly over a horizon of three
to twelve months generate signiﬁcant positive returns over the same horizon. They
state that one explanation could be that investors who follow a momentum strat-
egy temporarily move prices away from their long run values. Conrad and Kaul
(1998) ﬁnds similar results as Jegadeesh and Titman (1993). Chan, Jegadeesh,
and Lakonishok (1996) ﬁnd that price momentum and earnings momentum each
predict large drifts in future stock returns. Their explanation is that the mar-
ket responds gradually to new information. These papers are all based on US
stocks. Similar evidence in favour of the momentum eﬀect has been documented
for Europe market by Rouwenhorst (1998) who shows that abnormal returns to
momentum strategies could be found on 12 European markets. Evidence on mo-
mentum has been found for emerging markets by Rouwenhorst (1999) and van der
Hart, Slagter, and van Dijk (2001). While the momentum eﬀect has been well
documented, the cause of momentum is still an open issue. Fama and French
(1996) argue that many of the anomalies in asset returns are related, and that
their three-factor model captures these anomalies.
Recently, several authors have tried to connect momentum to other factors
than ﬁrm speciﬁc. Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999) ague that momentum can be
traced to industry factors and Lewellen (2002) extend the analysis to size and
book-to-market sorted portfolios.
An important issue when evaluating a large set of trading rules is data-snooping.
As argued by Lo and MacKinlay (1990), the data-snooping bias can be substan-
tial in ﬁnancial studies. Data snooping occurs when a given set of data is used
more than once for inference or model selection. The problem of data-snooping
has been mentioned in several papers. For example, Merton (1987, p. 107) poses
the question “Is it reasonable to use the standard t-statistic as a valid measure
of signiﬁcance when the test is conducted on the same data used by many earlier
studies whose result inﬂuenced the choice of theory to be tested?” Savin (1984)
and Lakonishok and Smidt (1984) made the remark that the actual size of a t-test
that follows a search for the largest possible t-statistics can be very diﬀerent from
its nominal size. To address the question of data mining in momentum strate-
1gies Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) test for momentum using an extended data set.
They ﬁnd that momentum strategies continue to be proﬁtable at about the same
magnitude as in the earlier period.
This paper explores the proﬁtability of portfolio-based momentum strategies.
More speciﬁcally, we investigate if momentum exists in a set of portfolios formed
on industry, size and book-to-market. The departure from earlier studies lies in
the way we test for proﬁtability. To deal with the problem of data snooping we use
the procedure provided by White (2000). Hence, we investigate if a momentum
strategy is superior over a benchmark model once the eﬀects of data-snooping have
been accounted for. This procedure is known as White’s Reality Check.
2 Data and descriptive statistics
The data consists of all NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks on the CRSP database.
The analysis considers the period July 1963 to December 2002. Furthermore, the
tests are performed on portfolios formed on industry, size, and book-to-market.
The industry portfolios are constructed by assigning each stock to an industry
portfolio at the end of June of year t based on its four digit SIC code at that time.
The size and book-to-market portfolios are constructed at the end of June of year
t using NYSE breakpoints respectively. All portfolios are value-weighted1.
Table 1 reports summary statistics for 17 industry portfolios, 10 size and 10
book-to-market portfolios and the 25 size and book-to-market portfolios. The
average returns for the industry portfolios range from 0.69% to 1.15% resulting
in a annualized spread of 5.56%. The large number of ﬁrms in the industries
indicates that the industry portfolios are well diversiﬁed. An F-test of whether
the mean returns diﬀers across industries is not rejected, suggesting there is little
cross-sectional variation in the industry sample means. The average returns for the
book-to-market and size portfolios range from 0.81% to 1.30% and 0.87% to 1.18%,
which result in annualized spreads of 5.92% and 3.78%, respectively. Furthermore,
the large average number of ﬁrms indicates that the portfolios are well diversiﬁed.
Again, F-tests are not rejected.
The cross sectional variation is larger in the size and book-to-market portfolios.
The annualized spread is 11.28% and the number of ﬁrms in each portfolio is lower.
However, the F-test of equal mean returns is not rejected. Overall, ﬁrm speciﬁc
factors should not be important in these portfolios.
3 Momentum Portfolios
To form the momentum strategies we have to specify the length of the period over
which we rank the returns k, the proportion of winner and losers to include q, and
1We thank Kenneth R. French for providing the data at http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/
faculty/ken.french/data library.html.
2Table 1a: Descriptive statistics
Industry
Portfolio Average Return Std.dev Ave. No. of ﬁrms
Food 1.135 4.531 151
Mining and Minerals 0.884 6.362 68
Oil 1.034 5.246 198
Textiles 0.955 6.119 135
Consumer Durables 1.028 5.757 159
Chemicals 0.887 5.308 80
Drugs, Soap, Tobacco 1.153 4.817 164
Construction 0.973 5.869 197
Steel 0.699 6.369 82
Fabricated Products 0.898 5.423 57
Machinery Equipment 0.946 6.534 591
Automobiles 0.871 6.031 70
Transportation 0.991 5.902 152
Utilities 0.773 4.131 166
Retail Stores 1.062 5.601 286
Finance 1.045 5.108 783
Other 0.866 5.034 1275
Book-to-Market
Portfolio Average return Std.dev Ave. No. of ﬁrms
Low 0.8152 5.3385 638
2 0.9340 4.8461 389
3 0.9458 4.8024 352
4 0.9305 4.7247 324
5 0.9552 4.4304 319
6 1.0728 4.4267 321
7 1.1496 4.3656 326
8 1.190 4.3586 336
9 1.2441 4.6578 368
High 1.2996 5.4573 457
Size
Portfolio Average return Std.dev Ave. No. of ﬁrms
Small 1.1802 6.4667 2287
2 1.1310 6.3371 568
3 1.1529 6.0494 374
4 1.1161 5.8716 288
5 1.1466 5.5599 242
6 1.0408 5.3194 204
7 1.0690 5.1775 182
8 1.0418 5.0764 170
9 0.9728 4.6413 156
Large 0.8675 4.3398 150
3Table 1b: Descriptive statistics
25 Size-book-to-market
Size B/M Average Return Std.dev Ave. No. of ﬁrms
Small Low 0.632 8.276 531
2 1.200 7.087 332
3 1.280 6.110 329
4 1.491 5.675 393
High 1.566 5.944 637
2 Low 0.801 7.561 164
2 1.063 6.114 115
3 1.326 5.405 113
4 1.389 5.173 103
5 1.422 5.759 80
3 1 0.830 6.904 122
2 1.143 5.503 88
3 1.155 4.974 80
4 1.288 4.724 67
High 1.433 5.377 47
4 Low 0.955 6.158 100
2 0.931 5.196 74
3 1.131 4.892 64
4 1.255 4.681 53
High 1.346 5.414 35
Large Low 0.883 4.877 107
2 0.911 4.599 66
3 0.951 4.375 53
4 1.056 4.308 43
High 1.019 4.799 25
4the length of the period for holding the selected portfolios l. Letting k = 1,...,K,
l = 1,...,L and q = qi, i = 1,...,Q yields KQL diﬀerent strategies.
Let Rit be the net return for portfolio i in period t, then the return of each
momentum strategy is calculated as follows. Let




(1 + Ri,t−j) − 1, t > k. (1)
2. To construct the portfolios of winners and losers we sort the portfolios ac-
cordingly to the returns calculated in step 1. The winner portfolio is then
formed by giving equal weights to the q percent portfolios with the highest
geometrically compounded return. Similarly, we form the loser portfolio by
giving equal weights to the q percent portfolios with the lowest geometrically
compounded return. The momentum strategy generate a zero-cost portfolio,
that buys the winners and sells the losers. This position is held for the next
l months.
3. Every month a new momentum portfolio is formed and the oldest momentum
portfolio is retired. After an initial ranking period of length K+L we have
L diﬀerent momentum portfolios. The return of the strategy is the average
return from all L portfolios that are held simultaneously during period t.
4. Working through the T periods we have a time series of momentum returns
for each of the KLQ momentum strategies.
4 Is momentum due to data-snooping?
White (2000) presents a methodology for testing hypothesis about predictive su-
periority over a benchmark model taking into account the eﬀect of data-snooping.
To evaluate the proﬁtability of the momentum strategies we compare the returns
of each strategy to the return of the benchmark. Since the momentum portfolios
are zero-cost portfolios by construction, the appropriate benchmark return is zero.
Let X be the (T −K −L)×(KLQ) matrix of momentum returns. The vector
of average returns is
¯ X =
1




The null hypothesis is that the strategy with the highest average return is no
better than the benchmark. Hence, the null hypothesis is
H0 : max
j=1,...,KLQ
E( ¯ Xj) ≤ 0. (3)
5and the alternative hypothesis is that the best strategy is superior to the bench-
mark.




(T − K − L)( ¯ Xj). (4)
Since the asymptotic distribution of Vmax under the null hypothesis is nonstandard,
White (2000) suggested two ways to approximate it. The ﬁrst option is Monte
Carlo simulation. In this case, one needs to estimate consistently Ω, the covariance
matrix of the returns. Then one samples returns from N(0, b Ω) and the desired p-
value can be obtained from the distribution of the extremes of N(0, b Ω). The second
approach is to use the bootstrap to draw from the empirical distribution of ¯ X. In
our case the number of strategies exceeds the number of observations so the only
feasible implementation is the second one. In addition, drawing from the empirical
distribution has the advantage that it does not rely on restrictive distributional
assumptions.
The bootstrap samples can be generated in several ways. One approach is the
stationary bootstrap of Politis and Romano (1994), another is the block bootstrap
of K¨ unsch (1989). The stationary bootstrap is used for two reasons. First, it
generates stationary samples and second, it does not requires the determination
of an optimal block-length.
Let ξb, b = 1,...,B be (T −K −L×1) vectors of row indexes. The stationary
bootstrap constructs indexes, ξb, b = 1,...,B, by combining blocks with random
length. Where the length follows a geometric distribution with parameter ρ ∈
[0,1). The expected block length is 1/ρ.
The bootstrap samples are given by X∗
b,t = Xξb,t, t = 1,...,(T − K − L),
which leads to the sample average ¯ X∗
b, b = 1,...,B. Furthermore, ¯ X∗
b preserves
the unconditional means, the cross-sectional correlation (by sampling vector of
returns) and any time dependence in the average returns (2). The bootstrap






(T − K − L)( ¯ X
∗
b − ¯ X), b = 1,...,B (5)
and White’s Reality Check p-value is obtained as the fraction of times that Vmax
is larger then V ∗
max,b for b = 1,...,B. By using the maximum values over all KLQ
strategies, the Reality Check p-values is corrected for the eﬀect of data-snooping.
5 Empirical Results
This section evaluates the proﬁtability of momentum investment strategies de-
scribed in the previous sections.
Table 2 contains the momentum proﬁts for the three diﬀerent portfolios using 6
and 12 month for formation. Each momentum portfolio consists of the 20 percent
6Table 2: Momentum proﬁts
Panel A: 17 Industry Portfolios
Month after formation (L)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
K=6 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.33 0.41 0.46 0.47 0.46 0.44 0.41 0.37 0.32
K=12 0.64 0.59 0.52 0.50 0.48 0.45 0.42 0.40 0.36 0.33 0.30 0.26
Panel B: Book-to-Market Portfolios
Month after formation (L)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
K=6 0.20 0.17 0.19 0.19 0.18 0.196 0.19 0.17 0.16 0.14 0.13 0.10
K=12 0.33 0.27 0.23 0.20 0.17 0.14 0.12 0.10 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.07
Panel C: Size Portfolios
Month after formation (L)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
K=6 0.19 0.16 0.19 0.22 0.28 0.32 0.33 0.32 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.28
K=12 0.52 0.47 0.46 0.45 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.47 0.45 0.44 0.43 0.42
Panel D: Size-book/market Portfolios
Month after formation (L)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
K=6 0.47 0.41 0.39 0.38 0.39 0.42 0.42 0.40 0.38 0.36 0.34 0.30
K=12 0.64 0.56 0.51 0.47 0.45 0.42 0.40 0.38 0.35 0.32 0.30 0.27
The table contains the momentum proﬁts in percentage. K and L stands for the ranking
and the holding period, respectively. In the industry and size-book/market portfolios the
20% of winners and losers corresponds to 2 and 3 portfolios, respectively.
with the highest compounded return and the 20 percent lowest compounded re-
turns. For the strategy based on 12-month returns, the proﬁt of the winner minus
the loser portfolio is highest in the month immediately following formation. After
one month, the proﬁts decline. The proﬁts based on 6-month returns are less reg-
ular. The momentum proﬁts are consistent with Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999)
and Lewellen (2002) except that they ﬁnd the reversal in the industry portfolios
for 9 or more month after formation.
Note that we have not investigated if momentum proﬁts diﬀer signiﬁcantly from
the benchmark return. In this paper we want to take into account the problem of
data-snooping and therefore use the method proposed by White (2000) known as
the White’s reality check.
5.1 Is Momentum Due to Data-Snooping?
White’s reality check is applied to a universe of momentum strategies. For a given
proportion of winner and loser portfolios q, we let the ranking k, and holding period
l, range from 1 to 12 months. The proportion of winner and loser portfolios is 10%,
7Table 3: Momentum test results
17 Industry Book-to-Market
Period White’s p-value White’s p-value
196307-200212 0.006 (0.001) 0.104 (0.021)
196307-198112 0.013 (0.003) 0.436 (0.040)
198201-200212 0.145 (0.017) 0.130 (0.018)
Size Size-book/market
Period White’s p-value White’s p-value
196307-200212 0.003 (0.001) 0.002(0.001)
196307-198112 0.012 (0.002) 0.009(0.002)
198201-200212 0.095 (0.026) 0.061 (0.017)
Nominal p-value in parenthesis. The p-values are based on 1000
bootstrap samples. ρ = 0.2 which implies an expected block-
length of 5 observations.
20%, 30%, and 40%. This results in 576 momentum portfolios. Since the industry
contains 17 portfolios we cannot take exactly 10%, 20%, 30% and 40% winners and
losers. The same problem exists for the 25 size-book/market portfolios. Instead,
we take 2, 4, 5 and 7 and 3, 5, 8 and 10 winner and loser portfolios in industry
and size-book/market. We also consider two sub-samples, 1963:07-1981:12 and
1982:01-2002:12.
In Table 3 we report the result for testing the null hypothesis that the best
momentum strategy does not outperform the benchmark, which is the zero return.
The table reports White’s Reality Check p-value and the nominal p-value (in
parenthesis). The number of bootstrap samples is 1000 and let (ρ = 0.2) which
implies an expected block length of 5 observations2. The nominal p-value is the
result of applying the bootstrap to the best trading rule only. Hence, by using the
nominal p-value we ignore the eﬀects of data-snooping and the diﬀerence between
the two p-values yields the magnitude of data-snooping bias.
Firstly, and perhaps most important, we note that the data-snooping bias is
very substantial. Neglecting the data-snooping eﬀect we always reject the null
hypothesis while the evidence is mixed when taking account of data-snooping.
Starting with the whole sample period, the momentum eﬀect is signiﬁcant for the
industry, size and the double sorted portfolios. For the book-to-market portfolios
the White reality check p-values are all above 10% indicating that momentum is
not that strong for the these portfolios.
Considering the sub samples yields diﬀerent results. Starting with the pe-
riod 1963:07-1981:12 we obtain very low p-values for the industry, size, and size-
book/market portfolios. During the second period 1982:01-2002:12 we have the
2In Appendix we investigate the robustness of the results with respect to ρ. It appears like
our results are insensitive to the choice of ρ
8opposite. The reality check p-values are 14.5%, 9.5%, and 6.1% for industry, size
and size- book/market, respectively. Using the conventional 5.0% signiﬁcance level
the null of no superior returns in momentum strategies cannot be rejected. This
indicates that the proﬁtability of momentum strategies is due to the high prof-
itability over the ﬁrst half of the sample period.
A similar method to test for superior predictive has been proposed by Hansen
(2003). Unlike the White reality check it is not sensitive to poor and irrelevant
alternatives. We carry out the same analysis using Hansen’s procedure. Since the
main conclusions do not change we present the results based on White’s reality
check only.
6 Summary and Conclusion
This paper explores the proﬁtability of portfolio-based momentum strategies. The
data consists of all NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks on the CRSP database.
The analysis considers the period July 1963 to December 2002 and the tests are per-
formed on portfolios formed for industry, size, book-to-market and double sorted
on size and book-to-market.
The departure from earlier studies lies in the way we test for proﬁtability. To
avoid the serious problem of data-snooping we apply the procedure provided by
White (2000). Hence, we investigate if a momentum strategy is superior over a
benchmark model once the eﬀects of data-snooping have been accounted for.
Overall, we ﬁnd strong evidence of a momentum eﬀect where an investor takes
a long position on the winner portfolio and a short position on the loser portfolio.
Hence, we reject the hypothesis of weak market eﬃciency. Splitting the sample in
two parts, 1963:07 to 1981:12 and 1982:01 to 2002:12 we found that the momentum
strategy was proﬁtable during the ﬁrst period and not during the second. The
overall signiﬁcance is thus driven by events in the earlier part of the sample and
it appears that the market has become more eﬃcient.
Finally, and perhaps most important, our results shows that data snooping
bias can be very substantial. In this study, neglecting the problem would lead to
very diﬀerent conclusions.
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11A Appendix
The stationary bootstrap of Politis and Romano (1994) depends on the speciﬁca-
tion of ρ. When the block length is geometrically distributed, ρ is the inverse of
the expected block length. To investigate the robustness of the results in Section
5.1 to the choice of ρ, we compute the White’s reality check and the nominal p-
values for two additional values of ρ in the bootstrapping procedure i.e. ρ = 0.1
and ρ = 0.5. Table A contains the results. By comparing Table A with Table 3 it
is seen that ρ do not aﬀect the main conclusions.
Table A.1: Momentum test results, ρ = 0.1
17 Industry Book-to-Market
Period White’s p-value White’s p-value
196307-200212 0.002 (0.001) 0.116 (0.021)
196307-198112 0.002 (0.001) 0.435 (0.037)
198201-200212 0.104 (0.015) 0.131 (0.011)
Size Size-book/market
Period White’s p-value White’s p-value
196307-200212 0.005 (0.001) 0.021(0.010)
196307-198112 0.014 (0.002) 0.030(0.019)
198201-200212 0.124 (0.022) 0.140 (0.023)
Nominal p-value in parenthesis
Table A.2: Momentum test results, ρ = 0.5
17 Industry Book-to-Market
Period White’s p-value White’s p-value
196307-200212 0.007 (0.001) 0.123 (0.021)
196307-198112 0.014 (0.004) 0.427 (0.047)
198201-200212 0.148 (0.028) 0.146 (0.034)
Size Size-book/market
Period White’s p-value White’s p-value
196307-200212 0.002 (0.001) 0.021(0.017)
196307-198112 0.008 (0.004) 0.040(0.028)
198201-200212 0.159 (0.041) 0.170 (0.062)
Nominal p-value in parenthesis
12